Marital Deduction--Terminable Interests--Missouri Law by Lowe, Henry T.
Missouri Law Review 
Volume 29 
Issue 1 Winter 1964 Article 8 
Winter 1964 
Marital Deduction--Terminable Interests--Missouri Law 
Henry T. Lowe 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Henry T. Lowe, Marital Deduction--Terminable Interests--Missouri Law, 29 MO. L. REV. (1964) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol29/iss1/8 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri School of Law 
Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Missouri Law Review by an authorized editor of 





Uniformity amid diversity is a recurring problem in federal taxation.
The uniform application of the federal revenue laws to all the people is
plainly desirable for a variety of reasons, not the least of which is simple
fairness. Yet the laws of the several states in their structure and application
vary greatly, and despite the many laudable efforts to promote uniformity,
and some notable accomplishments, great areas of difference still remain
and predictably will always be present. In an effective federal system of
income and death taxation points of impact between the federal revenue
laws and the local rules, particularly those relating to property, are both
inevitable and innumerable, and since reference to local concepts is un-
avoidable, strict uniformity is impossible. It is a dogma no thoughtful
critic should champion.,
At the other extreme there is also a dogma, equally unacceptable
and unaccepted, which I will refer to as the incorporation dogma. It sug-
gests that, absent a clear congressional direction to the contrary, when the
federal tax law uses a term with a settled local meaning, that local meaning
shall control. In this view the States through their courts and legislatures
have a significant creative function in federal tax law making; they may
decide how and when particular measures shall be applied to their residents
by fixing the form of their rules and the interpretation to be placed upon
them.
Recent history furnishes an excellent example of this second dogma.
Employees of corporations are entitled to deferred compensation benefits
not generally available to self-employed individuals and others.2 Those
unable to avail themselves of these benefits, particularly professional peo-
*Professor of Law, University of Missouri.
1. PAUL, SELECTED STUDIES IN FEDERAL TAXATION, SECOND SERIES, The Effect
on Federal Taxation of Local Rales of Property, p. 1 (1938); Cahn, Local Law in
Federal Taxation, 52 YALE LJ. 799 (1943).
2. Rev. Rul. 163, 1957-1 CuM. BULL. 128; Rev. Rul. 33, 1953-1 CuM. BULL.
267; I.T. 3350, 1940-1 CuM. BULL. 64; I.T. 3268, 1939-1 CuM. BULL. 196.
(13)
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ple, have complained bitterly of the unfairness of the scheme, and for years
have sought relief from the Congress, but only recently did they achieve
any success in this direction and even this is partial and quite unsatisfac-
tory.3 The incorporation dogma suggests another alternative, however.
Since the benefits are available to employees of corporations the answer
lies in local legislation which will authorize the professional class to form
organizations designated "corporation" or "association." These organiza-
tions, however, retain those characteristics which enlightened public policy
has long deemed necessary for the proper rendition of professional service,
and at some crucial points these characteristics conflict with attributes
traditionally associated with the corporation concept. Within a space of a
few years many of the states have enacted measures of this type, with
the sole and avowed object of obtaining for their residents the benefits of
the federal legislation.4 In view of the long fight in Congress and the limita-
tions that Congress eventually imposed on benefits available to self-em-
ployed persons it is understandable that the Internal Revenue Service
should express its categorical disapproval of these measures, as it recently
didY That view, of course, is only one, and predictions on what the courts
will do with this legislation are not wanting, with the experts in sharp
disagreement." If Congress doesn't intervene, the courts ultimately must
choose between the conflicting demands and claims advanced in the names
of uniformity and incorporation, and these choices will have an important
bearing on the future development of the federal income tax law.
While neither of the extremes, strict uniformity or strict incorpora-
3. Self-Employed Individuals Tax Retirement Act of 1962, 76 Stat. 809
(1962). Critical comments on the limited scope of this legislation are numerous.
Among others are Joyner, Pemberton, Taylor, Tax Dilemma of the Self-Employed
Professional, 28 Mo. L. REv. 161 (1963); Whiteside, Self-Employed Individuals
Retirement Act of 1962, 51 Ky. L.J. 325 (1962); and Grayck, Tax Qualified Re-
tirement Plans for Professional Practitioners: A Comparison of the Self-Employed
Individuals Tax Requirement [sic] Act of 1962 and the Professional Association, 63
COLUM. L. REv. 415 (1963).
4. Missouri enacted such a measure in 1963. The Professional Corporation
Law of Missouri, c. 356 RSMo 1959 (1963 supp.).
5. Recently the Internal Revenue Service has published its proposed amend-
ments to the income tax regulations to clarify the tax treatment of professional
service corporations, associations, trusts, and other organizations. These proposals,
if adopted, would make it virtually impossible for professional service organiza-
tions to qualify as corporations for federal income tax purposes. Proposed Treas.
Reg. § 301.7701-1(d) and § 301.7701-2(h), 28 Fed. Reg. 13750 (1963).
6. Bittker, Professional Associations and Federal Income Taxation: Some
Questions and Comments, 17 TAx L. Ray. 1 (1961); Anderson, Tax Aspects of
Professional Corporations, U. So. CAL. 1963 TAx INST. 309.
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tion, is acceptable or accepted, there seems to be a greater tendency on
the part of the judiciary to err on the side of the latter than the former.
I would like to suggest some reasons for this. The cases which come before
the courts often involve narrow points of construction and interpretation,
and in the heat of litigation the advocates may neglect or fail to emphasize
the impact and importance of a broad policy. In many instances Congress
has not clearly expressed a policy of uniformity, and if there is such a
policy, the courts must find or create it with the traditional tools of statutory
construction; here the form of the Internal Revenue Code makes the job
extremely difficult; all the traditional linguistic and grammatical problems
are magnified because of the bulk of the law and its complex internal
structure. Familiarity with local law is another important factor; lawyers
and judges are more comfortable when they cast their materials in familiar
molds; and for a profession conditioned in the atmosphere of Erie v. Tomp-
kins the notion of a uniform rule overriding local differences is a difficult
one. Finally, with some judges there is the matter of antipathy to the tax
collector, particularly evident in some of the federal district court opinions
where a local rule may tip the scales in the taxpayer's favor. If a point of
law is not settled in the local jurisprudence, a judge so disposed has the
opportunity to assist the taxpayer by deciding the local law in his favor,
and often the result is contrary to what most lawyers would predict if
the same point were litigated in the state courts in an adversary proceed-
ing. The consequences of this last point are far reaching; for any number
of reasons there may be no appeal of the trial court's decision and as a
consequence it will stand as the law in a particular state for a substantial
period; if there is an appeal the upper court may be reluctant or unwilling
to overturn a lower court finding on a local law point; and finally there is
the practical impossibility of obtaining review by the Supreme Court.
Four recent decisions involve the relationship of certain aspects of Mis-
souri law to the marital deduction provisions of the federal estate tax
law; they exemplify many of the difficult questions I have mentioned above.
In Phelps,7 Gardnere and Avery' the courts decided a widow's allowance
7. Bookwalter v. Estate of Phelps, 325 F.2d 186 (8th Cir. 1963), affirming
210 F. Supp. 801 (W.D.Mo. 1962).
8. Estate of Gardner v. United States, 220 F. Supp. 196 (E.D.Mo. 1963).
9. Estate of Avery v. Commissioner, 40 T.C. 392 (1963), on appeal to the
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.
1964]
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under Missouri law was a deductible item and in Lamar'° the court decided
a conditional bequest was not a deductible item.
I. CONDITioNAL BEQUEST TO SPOUSE
The Lamar case illustrates the difficulties of accommodating the ter-
minable interest rule to local law. Here decedent husband bequeathed the
residue of his estate to his wife absolutely, but if the wife "shall not survive
the administration of my estate" the property shall pass to children and
grandchildren. In fact the wife did survive and receive the property. At
first blush the bequest seems a clear case of a disqualified terminable
interest under the statutory definition;- the interest terminates if the
wife dies before a certain event occurs; an interest in the property passes
without consideration from the husband to children and grandchildren;
and the children and grandchildren by virtue of the form of the bequest
will possess or enjoy the property if the wife dies before the event takes
place. Indeed, this appears to be the paradigm of a forbidden terminable
interest. As if to remove all doubt in a case of this kind, Congress carefully
spelled out an exception to the terminable interest rule where the spouse
must survive for a limited period;' 2 this exception says that the interest
is not a forbidden terminable interest, where the wife in fact survives, if the
will or other governing instrument passes an interest to someone other
than the wife (1) under a common disaster clause or (2) if the wife
should die within six months after the decedent. The condition in Lamar
does not satisfy either alternative mentioned in the statutory exception.
Expressio unius etc.!
How then did the district court conclude the Lamar bequest was not
a forbidden terminable interest? By looking to local law. In an earlier
case, Kellar,23 the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit had before it
a similar situation; there the gift to the surviving wife of a South Dakota
decedent failed unless she was "living at the time of the distribution of
my estate." Concluding that the question was one of local law, the court
remanded the case to the district court in South Dakota where the estate
10. Bookwalter v. Estate of Lamar, 323 F.2d 664 (8th Cir. 1963), reversing
213 F. Supp. 860 (W.D.Mo. 1963); cert. denied - U.S. - (1964).
11. INT. REv. CODE Or 1954, § 2056(b)(1); Treas. Reg. §20.2056(b)-3(d),
Example 4 (1958), supports this view.
12. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §2056(b) (3).
13. Kasper v. Estate of Kellar, 217 F.2d 744 (8th Cir. 1955).
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prevailed." In Lamar the estate also prevailed in the district court on the
basis of local law, but the Eighth Circuit reversed emphasizing that its
result was consistent with a decision by the Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit in Mappes' 5 which denied a deduction where the gift to an
Oklahoma widow failed if she "should die before my estate has been
administered." Significantly the Eighth Circuit in Lamar again relied on
local law, choosing to disagree with the district judge. It distinguished the
South Dakota case principally because the district court in South Dakota
found that the clause "if living at the time of the distribution of my
estate" was ambiguous.
As a matter of common sense, linguistic convention, and grammatical
construction the clauses in the three wills in Lamar, Kellar and Mappes
are similar and the result should be the same. Quite apart from obvious
inequality there is no reason that residents of South Dakota should have
greater latitude in making conditional bequests to spouses than those in
Oklahoma and Missouri or in any other state; the difference between six
months from the date of death and the period of administration of the
estate is substantial. Of course, if Congress says or clearly implies it wants
such a result, that is the end of the matter. But there is nothing like
that in the statute or in the committee reports. Perhaps the district courts
in these cases stretched a point in the taxpayers' favor, and, properly
interpreted, there is no difference in the local law in the three states. But
on the other hand it is possible, although unlikely, that the highest appellate
courts of the states would reach contrary results on whether the language
in the wills in question created vested or conditional interests in the wife.
Nevertheless it seems unwarranted to allow this difference to control the
interpretation of the terminable interest rule where the federal law re-
quirements are definite and certain and uniformity is so desirable.
II. WIDow's ALLOWANCE
The federal estate tax status of the widow's allowance has been un-
settled since 1950. In that year Congress repealed an express provisiono
permitting the deduction partly for the reason that in practice it had led
to inequality; the allowance came from state law and some states authorized
14. Estate of Kellar v. Kasper, 138 F. Supp. 738 (W.D.S.D. 1956).
15. United States v. Estate of Mappes, 318 F.2d 508 (10th Cir. 1963).
16. INT. REv. CODE OF 1939, § 812(b)(5).
1964]
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more liberal allowances than others.'1 Since 1950 the sole basis for claiming
the deduction has been the marital deduction, and the principal battle-
ground has been the terminable interest rule. Here, the courts, encouraged
by the Internal Revenue Service, s have given full sway to the incorpora-
tion dogma, and the results exhibit all the differences and peculiarities of
the state laws. The question is timely because the Supreme Court has
recently decided a case which may go far in resolving some of the difficult
questions these cases raise. 0
The Internal Revenue Service has assumed that the widow's allow-
ance qualifies for the marital deduction, as an interest which passes,20
so long as the interest viewed from the standpoint of state law is not termi-
nable.21 While there is some language in the committee reports which may
sustain this view on the passing question,22 it is apparent that by conceding
that the terminable interest question is to be determined under local law
the Service introduced immediately the same problem which Congress had
apparently intended to put to rest-diversity of treatment between resi-
dents of separate states. One has only to read the cases to learn the extent
to which this has occurred. In one case23 a widow had a life estate under
her husband's will which presumably would not qualify for the marital
deduction; under a statute authorizing support and maintenance for
twelve months she received an allowance of $50,000 where the gross estate
was approximately $100,000. By permitting the deduction the court in
effect recognized the widow's allowance as an effective estate splitting
device available after death. At the other extreme a relatively modest lump
sum allowance of $12,000 from a large estate did not qualify due to the
wording of the local law.24
The Missouri statute authorizing a widow's allowance, -25 typical of
17. H.R. REP. No. 2319, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 1950-2 CuM. BULL. 380, 424;
S. REP. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 1950-2 CuM. BULL. 483, 525.
18. Rev. Rul. 83, 1953-1 CUM. BULL. 395; Treas. Reg. §20.20 5 6(e)(2)(a)(1958).
19. Estate of Jackson v. United States, 375 U.S. 894 (1964); 64-1 U.S.T.C.
Wf12221, afflrming 317 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1963).
20. Supra note 18.
21. Ibid.
22. H.R. REP. No. 2319, supra note 17, 1950-2 CuM. BULL. 380, 478; S. REP.
No. 2375, supra note 17, 1950-2 Cum. BULL. 483, 576.
23. Estate of Edmonson v. United States, 63-1 U.S.T.C. ff12142, Civil No.
965, D. Ga., March 28, 1963.
24. United States Nat'l Bank v. United States, 188 F. Supp. 332 (D. Ore.
1960).
25. § 474.260, RSMo 1959.
[Vol. 29
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many such provisions, specifies that the surviving spouse and the unmarried
minor children are entitled to a reasonable allowance for their maintenance
for a one year period after the death of the husband, according to their
previous standard of living and taking into account the condition of the
estate. Payment may be in a lump sum or installments, and the wife
receives the payment for her use and the use of the unmarried minor
children unless the court directs a separate allowance for the children.
Another section of the statute,2 6 added in 1955, provides that if the widow
dies no allowance shall be made for her for any period after her death.
The threshold question, whether an award under such a statute is an
interest passing from the husband to the wife, has been answered in the
affirmative by the Internal Revenue Service2r and apparently the Supreme
Court has also adopted this view.28 But quite apart from the passing ques-
tion there are a number of problems under the terminable interest rule.
If there is a single award for the widow and unmarried minor children
(as the statute apparently contemplates) and the widow dies while the
minor children remain unmarried, do the minor children have an interest
in the part of the award, if any, which remains? If so, the award probably
does not qualify.29 If the widow should die before entry of the order, is
her interest terminable by virtue of the express wording of the 1955 addi-
tion to the law? The answer to this question will depend upon how the
courts resolve the terminability question.30 Should the deduction depend
upon the promptness of the personal representative in obtaining the order?
And since the order may call for either lump sum or installment payments,
should the deduction depend upon the form of the order?
In the three recent decisions involving the application of Missouri law
the courts have allowed the deduction. In each case the order specified
a lump sum award to the widow, and apparently there were no unmarried
26. § 474.300, RSMo 1959.
27. Revenue Ruling and regulation cited sutpra note 18.
28. Estate of Jackson v. United States, supra note 19.
29. Estate of Hailey v. Commissioner, 36 T.C. 120 (1961).
30. The committee report accompanying the Revenue Act of 1948 states
flatly that in determining whether an interest in property is terminable the situa-
tion is viewed as at the date of decedents death. S. REP. No. 1013, 80th Cong., 2d
Sess., 1948-1 CUM. BULL. 285, 338. Nevertheless the courts have not been con-
sistent on this question. One approach illustrated in United States v. Estate of
Quivey, 292 F.2d 252 (8th Cir. 1961), follows the view expressed in the senate re-
port; the other approach illustrated in United States v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co.,
297 F.2d 312 (5th Cir. 1961), is to view the matter at the date of the award. As
pointed out, infra note 41, the Supreme Court in the Jackson case held that ter-
minability is to be judged as of the date of death not the date of the order.
1964]
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minor children so the question of terminability on that ground was not
present. Also in none of these cases was the widow the residuary beneficiary
of the estate.3' The government contested the deduction on the basis of
the 1955 addition to the probate law,3 2 urging that under that section death
was an event which caused the interest to fail and pass to another, a
position sustained by other courts. The district court in the Phelps case33
rejected this argument and for reasons suggested by the district judge,
the court of appeals in Pkelps,3 the district court in Gardner3 and the
Tax Court in Avery s followed suit. The district court in Phelps relied
on a decision of the St. Louis Court of Appeals37 under the pre-1955 Mis-
souri probate law to the effect that the estate of a surviving spouse could
collect the statutory allowance where the spouse died before the entry of
an order. Referring to commentaries on the 1955 addition to the law the
court concluded that the legislation did not change the prior law.
The Missouri statute, in common with most others, permits either a
lump sum allowance or one payable in installments. The possibilities for
the form of the order are numerous; a lump sum payable in cash or in
property; a lump sum payable in installments; installments payable monthly
or less frequently for a specified period; and a combination of a lump sum
and installment payments. A cursory glance at the cases indicates the
importance of form. With a few exceptions the lump sum orders have
fared well,3s while most of the cases in which the government has prevailed
involve installment payment orders.39 Unquestionably, it is easier to find
a vested indefeasible interest where the widow receives or has the right
to receive a single lump sum amount.
31. Where the widow takes as residuary beneficiary there is no terminable
interest problem since no interest passes to anyone other than the widow. Rev.
Rul. 26, 1956-1 CuM. BULL. 447.
32. Supra note 26.
33. Estate of Phelps v. Bookwalter, 210 F. Supp. 801 (W.D.Mo. 1962).
34. Bookwalter v. Estate of Phelps, 325 F.2d 186 (8th Cir. 1963).
35. Estate of Gardner v. United States, 220 F. Supp. 196 (E.D.Mo. 1963).
36. Estate of Avery v. Commissioner, 40 T.C. 392 (1963).
37. Monahan v. Monahan's Estate, 89 S.W.2d 153 (St. L. Mo. App. 1936).
38. These include: United States v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 297 F.2d
312 (5th Cir. 1961); Estate of Edmonson v. United States, supra note 23; Estate
of Molner v. United States, 175 F. Supp. 271 (N.D.Ill. 1959); Estate of Gale v.
Commissioner, 35 T.C. 215 (1960); Estate of Rudnick, 36 T.C. 1021 (1961); and
Estate of Rensenhouse v. Commissioner, 31 T.C. 818 (1959).
39. These include: Estate of Cunha v. Commissioner, 279 F.2d 292 (9th Cir.
1960); Estate of Jackson v. United States, supra note 19; United States v. Estate
of Quivey, 292 F.2d 252 (8th Cir. 1961); and Estate of Darby v. Wiseman, 323
F.2d 792 (10th Cir. 1963).
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Heretofore timing has also been important. If there is a risk of dis-
allowance where an order specifies installment payments, perhaps it is
better to wait for several months and obtain a lump sum order, particularly
if the question of terminability is to be viewed from the time of the entry
of the order and not from date of death, an interpretation rejected by the
Supreme Court in the Jackson case. 0 As a practical matter both form and
timing are under the control of the personal representative.
In the Jackson case the Supreme Court decided that no part of a
widow's allowance under California law qualified for the marital deduction
in these circumstances: the husband died May 27, 1951; the wife obtained
an order on June 30, 1952 authorizing payments to herself of $3,000 a
month beginning on the date of death for a period not to exceed two years;
and in fact the wife did receive $72,000 for the two year period. The court's
decision rests primarily on a point of federal law, that terminability for
purposes of the marital deduction is to be determined as of the date of
-death and not the date of the order authorizing the allowance, and two
points of California law: (1) the right to a widow's allowance is not
vested and nothing accrues before the order granting it; and (2) even
after an order is entered the right to future payments is lost if the widow
dies or remarries. In deciding that the question of terminability should be
judged as of the date of death, the Supreme Court in Jacksonr adopted
the view expressed in the committee reports41 and emphasized the undesir-
ability of a rule which made timing of an installment order determinative
of the deduction.
In assessing the impact of the Jackson case on future cases one must
consider several things. First and most important is the decision that the
date of death is the point of time to measure terminability. This point
alone will be sufficient to dispose of many cases. But as the court takes
pains to point out, the importance of local law remains. Significant differ-
ences in local law may lead to different results; this is to say that terminabil-
ity for purposes of the federal statute is first of all a question of local law;
the interest which passes is an interest created and shaped by local law.
Thus an installment type order under the laws of another state may
qualify for the deduction if the terminability test viewed from the date of
death is satisfied. Moreover, the fact that the Jackson case involved an
40. Supra note 19.
41. Supra note 30,
1964]
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installment type order suggests that in some instances there may be a
basis for distinguishing lump sum orders. As mentioned before, most of the
cases in the lower federal courts where the widow has prevailed have in-
volved lump sum orders. Here again the local law will be important, and
if the award, viewed from the date of death, is terminable under local law
the award will not qualify for the deduction.
The decision in the Jackson case probably calls for a reassessment
of the decisions involving Missouri law in Phelps, Gardner and Avery.4 3
Now, presumably, for an award under Missouri law to qualify for the de-
duction the right must be vested or fixed as of the date of death. Arguably
this requirement is satisfied by the reasoning of the lower court in the
Phelps case to the effect that death before entry of an order does not de-
stroy the right, which is transmissible to the estate of the decedent.44 In
this respect Missouri law as interpreted by the district court in Phelps,
differs from California law as interpreted by the Supreme Court in the
Jackson case. But the Jackson opinion may require that vesting of the right
is not sufficient unless the amount itself which is claimed as a deduction
is also vested as of the date of death. In view of the 1955 addition to the
Missouri Probate Code-that no allowance shall be made for maintenance
after death of the wife-this may be a difficult point for taxpayers to
sustain. The decision in the Monalan case,4 5 which the lower court in
Plelps relied on so heavily, does not stand for that proposition.
III. SOME CONcLUDING COMMENTS
In both situations-the conditional bequest cases and the widow's
allowance cases-the incorporation dogma poses the same fundamental
problem-differences in results based on real or supposed differences in
state laws. California law may lead to a different result than Missouri law,
even though in their significant features the laws are similar.4 When Con-
gress in the marital deduction used terms such as "interest," "property,"
"pass," "terminate," and "fail," quite clearly it made some reference to
local law. Basically it has legislated with regard to property interests
which originate in local law, and at one level reference to local law is
42. Supra note 38.
43. Supra notes 33, 34, 35 and 36.
44. Supra note 33.
45. Supra note 37.
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necessary. Yet on another level it is perfectly appropriate for Con-
gress to use the term "property" and "interest" more broadly or more
narrowly than local usage would suggest.47 The term "passing" is de-
fined in the statute;48 it has a peculiar federal meaning; yet on one level
it too is referable to state law. The terms "fail" or "terminate" have a
local reference-either to provisions found in wills, trusts, life insurance
policies and the like or to provisions of local law; yet the reference at this
level, as the Jackson case indicates, should be the beginning point not the
end. Whether a particular item, a conditional bequest or a widow's allow-
ance, fails or terminates should finally be a question of federal not local
law. ' There are two things at stake in these cases: a tax deduction to a
particular taxpayer and the administration of a law national in scope. As
recently as four years ago the Supreme Court recognized that local rules
need not govern the former. 50 In this article I have emphasized the impor-
tance of the latter and have suggested that in the rapidly developing field
of marital deduction law the Internal Revenue Service and the courts have
in some instances not recognized the impact which uniformity should have
on the law.
47. Some of the most interesting problems in the tax law involve these ad-
mittedly vague concepts. Among many examples one may point to the definitional
problems in the capital gain area and the anticipatory assignment of income ques-
tion.
48. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2056(e).
49. Of particular interest in the estate tax field are the decisions of the
Supreme Court in Morgan v. Commissioner, 309 U.S. 78 (1939) and United States
v. Stapf, 375 U.S. 118 (1963). In the Morgan case the court rejected the prop-
osition that the meaning of the undefined term "general power of appointment"
in the federal estate tax law was determined by local law. Recently in the Stapf
case the court decided that the provisions of a will did not govern the deductibility
of a claim against the estate even though the statute permitting a deduction for
claims against the estate specifically refers to local law and the item in question
was a personal liability of the decedent under local law.
50. Commissioner v. Lester, 366 U.S. 299 (1960).
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